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The (latest) crisis in confidence in social psychology has generated much heated
discussion about the importance of replication, including how it should be carried out
as well as interpreted by scholars in the field. For example, what does it mean if a
replication attempt “fails”—does it mean that the original results, or the theory that
predicted them, have been falsified? And how should “failed” replications affect our belief
in the validity of the original research? In this paper, we consider the replication debate
from a historical and philosophical perspective, and provide a conceptual analysis of both
replication and falsification as they pertain to this important discussion. Along the way, we
highlight the importance of auxiliary assumptions (for both testing theories and attempting
replications), and introduce a Bayesian framework for assessing “failed” replications in
terms of how they should affect our confidence in original findings.
Keywords: replication, falsification, falsifiability, crisis of confidence, social psychology, priming, philosophy of
science, Karl Popper
“Only when certain events recur in accordance with rules or regularities, as in the case of repeatable
experiments, can our observations be tested—in principle—by anyone.... Only by such repetition can we
convince ourselves that we are not dealing with a mere isolated ‘coincidence,’ but with events which, on
account of their regularity and reproducibility, are in principle inter-subjectively testable.”
– Karl Popper (1959, p. 45)
Introduction
Scientists pay lip-service to the importance of replication. It is the “coin of the scientific realm”
(Loscalzo, 2012, p. 1211); “one of the central issues in any empirical science” (Schmidt, 2009, p. 90);
or even the “demarcation criterion between science and nonscience” (Braude, 1979, p. 2). Similar
declarations have beenmade about falsifiability, the “demarcation criterion” proposed by Popper in
his seminal work of 1959 (see epigraph). As we will discuss below, the concepts are closely related—
and also frequently misunderstood. Nevertheless, their regular invocation suggests a widespread
if vague allegiance to Popperian ideals among contemporary scientists, working from a range of
different disciplines (Jordan, 2004; Jost, 2013). The cosmologist Hermann Bondi once put it this
way: “There is no more to science than its method, and there is no more to its method than what
Popper has said” (quoted in Magee, 1973, p. 2).
Experimental social psychologists have fallen in line. Perhaps in part to bolster our sense of
identity with the natural sciences (Danzinger, 1997), we psychologists have been especially keen to
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talk about replication. We want to trade in the “coin” of the
realm. As Billig (2013) notes, psychologists “cling fast to the
belief that the route to knowledge is through the accumulation
of [replicable] experimental findings” (p. 179). The connection
to Popper is often made explicit. One recent example comes
from Kepes and McDaniel (2013), from the field of industrial-
organizational psychology: “The lack of exact replication studies
[in our field] prevents the opportunity to disconfirm research
results and thus to falsify [contested] theories” (p. 257). They cite
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
There are problems here. First, there is the “lack” of replication
noted in the quote from Kepes and McDaniel. If replication
is so important, why isn’t it being done? This question has
become a source of crisis-level anxiety among psychologists in
recent years, as we explore in a later section. The anxiety is
due to a disconnect: between what is seen as being necessary
for scientific credibility—i.e., careful replication of findings
based on precisely-stated theories—and what appears to be
characteristic of the field in practice (Nosek et al., 2012).
Part of the problem is the lack of prestige associated with
carrying out replications (Smith, 1970). To put it simply, few
would want to be seen by their peers as merely “copying”
another’s work (e.g., Mulkay and Gilbert, 1986); and few could
afford to be seen in this way by tenure committees or by the
funding bodies that sponsor their research. Thus, while “a field
that replicates its work is [seen as] rigorous and scientifically
sound”—according to Makel et al. (2012)—psychologists who
actually conduct those replications “are looked down on as
bricklayers and not [as] advancing [scientific] knowledge”
(p. 537). In consequence, actual replication attempts are
rare.
A second problem is with the reliance on Popper—or, at any
rate, a first-pass reading of Popper that seems to be uninformed
by subsequent debates in the philosophy of science. Indeed, as
critics of Popper have noted, since the 1960s and consistently
thereafter, neither his notion of falsification nor his account
of experimental replicability seem strictly amenable to being
put into practice (e.g., Mulkay and Gilbert, 1981; see also
Earp, 2011)—at least not without considerable ambiguity and
confusion. What is more, they may not even be fully coherent
as stand-alone “abstract” theories, as has been repeatedly noted
as well (cf. Cross, 1982).
The arguments here are familiar. Let us suppose that—at the
risk of being accused of laying down bricks—Researcher B sets
up an experiment to try to “replicate” a controversial finding
that has been reported by Researcher A. She follows the original
methods section as closely as she can (assuming that this has been
published in detail; or even better, she simply asks Researcher
A for precise instructions). She calibrates her equipment. She
prepares the samples and materials just so. And she collects and
then analyzes the data. If she gets a different result from what was
reported by Researcher A—what follows? Has she “falsified” the
other lab’s theory? Has she even shown the original result to be
erroneous in some way?
The answer to both of these questions, as we will demonstrate
in some detail below, is “no.” Perhaps Researcher B made a
mistake (see Trafimow, 2014). Perhaps the other lab did. Perhaps
one of B’s research assistants wrote down the wrong number.
Perhaps the original effect is a genuine effect, but can only be
obtained under specific conditions—and we just don’t know yet
what they are (Cesario, 2014). Perhaps it relies on “tacit” (Polanyi,
1962) or “unofficial” (Westen, 1988) experimental knowledge
that can only be acquired over the course of several years,
and perhaps Researcher B has not yet acquired this knowledge
(Collins, 1975).
Or perhaps the original effect is not a genuine effect, but
Researcher A’s theory can actually accommodate this fact.
Perhaps Researcher A can abandon some auxiliary hypothesis,
or take on board another, or re-formulate a previously
unacknowledged background assumption—or whatever (cf.
Lakatos, 1970; Cross, 1982; Folger, 1989). As Lakatos (1970)
once put it: “given sufficient imagination, any theory... can be
permanently saved from ‘refutation’ by some suitable adjustment
in the background knowledge in which it is embedded” (p. 184).
We will discuss some of these potential “adjustments” below. The
upshot, however, is that we simply do not know, and cannot
know, exactly what the implications of a given replication attempt
are, no matter which way the data come out. There are no
critical tests of theories; and there are no objectively decisive
replications.
Popper (1959) was not blind to this problem. “In point of
fact,” he wrote, in an under-appreciated passage of his famous
book, “no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced,
for it is always possible to say that the experimental results
are not reliable, or that the discrepancies which are asserted to
exist between the experimental results and the theory are only
apparent” (p. 50, emphasis added). Hence as Mulkay and Gilbert
(1981) explain:
... in relation to [actual] scientific practice, one can only talk
of positive and negative results, and not of proof or disproof.
Negative results, that is, results which seem inconsistent with a given
hypothesis [or with a putative finding from a previous experiment],
may incline a scientist to abandon [the] hypothesis but they will
never require him to abandon it... Whether or not he does so
may depend on the amount and quality of positive evidence, on
his confidence in his own and others’ experimental skills and on
his ability to conceive of alternative interpretations of the negative
findings. (p. 391)
Drawing hard and fast conclusions, therefore, about “negative”
results—such as those that may be produced by a “failed”
replication attempt—is much more difficult than Kepes and
McDaniel seem to imagine (see e.g., Chow, 1988 for similarly
problematic arguments). This difficultymay be especially acute in
the field of psychology. As Folger (1989) notes, “Popper himself
believed that too many theories, particularly in the social sciences,
were constructed so loosely that they could be stretched to fit any
conceivable set of experimental results, making them... devoid
of testable content” (p. 156, emphasis added). Furthermore, as
Collins (1985) has argued, the less secure a field’s foundational
theories—and especially at the field’s “frontier”—the more room
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there is for disagreement about what should “count” as a proper
replication1.
Related to this problem is that it can be difficult to know in
what specific sense a replication study should be considered to be
“the same” as the original (e.g., Van IJzendoorn, 1994). Consider
that the goal for these kinds of studies is to rule out flukes and
other types of error. Thus, we want to be able to say that the
same experiment, if repeated one more time, would produce the
same result as was originally observed. But an original study and
a replication study cannot, by definition, be identical—at the very
least, some time will have passed and the participants will all be
new2—and if we don’t yet know which differences are theory-
relevant, we won’t be able to control for their effects. The problem
with a field like psychology, whose theoretical predictions are
often “constructed so loosely,” as noted above, is precisely that
we do not know—or at least, we do not in a large number of
cases—which differences are in fact relevant to the theory.
Finally, human behavior is notoriously complex. We are not
like billiard balls, or beavers, or planets, or paramecia (i.e.,
relatively simple objects or organisms). This means that we
should expect our behavioral responses to vary across a “wide
range of moderating individual difference and experimental
context variables” (Cesario, 2014, p. 41)—many of which are not
yet known, and some of whichmay be difficult or even impossible
to uncover (Meehl, 1990a). Thus, in the absence of “well-
developed theories for specifying such [moderating] variables,
the conclusions of replication failures will be ambiguous”
(Cesario, 2014, p. 41; see also Meehl, 1978).
Summing up the Problem
Hence we have two major points to consider. First, due to a lack
of adequate incentives in the reward structure of professional
science (e.g., Nosek and the Open Science Collaboration, 2012),
actual replication attempts are rarely carried out. Second, to the
extent that they are carried out, it can be well-nigh impossible to
say conclusively what they mean, whether they are “successful”
(i.e., showing similar, or apparently similar, results to the
original experiment) or “unsuccessful” (i.e., showing different,
or apparently different, results to the original experiment).
Thus, Collins (1985) came to the conclusion that, in physics
at least, disputes over contested findings are likelier to be
1There are two steps to understanding this idea. First, because the foundational
theories are so insecure, and the field’s findings so under dispute, the “correct”
empirical outcome of a given experimental design is unlikely to have been
firmly established. Second, and insofar the first step applies, the standard by
which to judge whether a replication has been competently performed is equally
unavailable—since that would depend upon knowing the “correct” outcome of
just such an experiment. Thus, a “competently performed” experiment is one
that produces the “correct” outcome; while the “correct” outcome is defined
by whatever it is that is produced by a “competently performed” experiment.
As Collins (1985) states: “Where there is disagreement about what counts as
a competently performed experiment, the ensuing debate is coextensive with
the debate about what the proper outcome of the experiment is” (p. 89).
This is the infamously circular experimenter’s regress. Of course, a competently
performed experiment should produce satisfactory (i.e., meaningful, useful) results
on “outcome neutral” tests.
2Assuming that it is a psychology experiment. Note that even if the “same”
participants are run through the experiment one more time, they’ll have changed
in at least one essential way: they’ll have already gone through the experiment
(opening the door for practice effects, etc.).
resolved by social and reputational negotiations—over, e.g., who
should be considered a competent experimenter—than by any
“objective” consideration of the experiments themselves. Meehl
(1990b) drew a similar conclusion about the field of social
psychology, although he identified sheer boredom (rather than
social/reputational negotiation) as the alternative to decisive
experimentation:
... theories in the “soft areas” of psychology have a tendency to
go through periods of initial enthusiasm leading to large amounts
of empirical investigation with ambiguous over-all results. This
period of infatuation is followed by various kinds of amendment
and the proliferation of ad hoc hypotheses. Finally, in the long run,
experimenters lose interest rather than deliberately discard a theory
as clearly falsified. (p. 196)
So how shall we take stock of what has been said? A cynical reader
might conclude that—far from being a “demarcation criterion
between science and nonscience”—replication is actually closer
to being a waste of time. Indeed, if even replications in physics
are sometimes not conclusive, as Collins (1975, 1981, 1985) has
convincingly shown, then what hope is there for replications in
psychology?
Our answer is simply as follows. Replications do not need
to be “conclusive” in order to be informative. In this paper,
we highlight some of the ways in which replication attempts
can be more, rather than less, informative, and we discuss—
using a Bayesian framework—how they can reasonably affect a
researcher’s confidence in the validity of an original finding. The
same is true of “falsification.”Whilst a scientist should not simply
abandon her favorite theory on account of a single (apparently)
contradictory result—as Popper himself was careful to point out3
(1959, pp. 66–67; see also Earp, 2011)—she might reasonably be
open to doubt it, given enough disconfirmatory evidence, and
assuming that she had stated the theory precisely. Rather than
being a “waste of time,” therefore, experimental replication of
one’s own and others’ findings can be a useful tool for restoring
confidence in the reliability of basic effects—provided that certain
conditions are met. The work of the latter part of this essay is to
describe and to justify at least a few of those essential conditions.
In this context, we draw a distinction between “conceptual” or
“reproductive” replications (cf. Cartwright, 1991)—which may
conceivably be used to bolster confidence in a particular theory—
and “direct” or “close” replications, which may be used to bolster
confidence in a finding (Schmidt, 2009; see also Earp et al., 2014).
Since it is doubt about the findings that seems to have prompted
the recent “crisis” in social psychology, it is the latter that will be
our focus. But first we must introduce the crisis.
3On Popper’s view, one must set up a “falsifying hypothesis,” i.e., a hypothesis
specifying how another experimenter could recreate the falsifying evidence. But
then, Popper says, the falsifying hypothesis itself should be severely tested and
corroborated before it is accepted as falsifying the main theory. Interestingly, as
a reviewer has suggested, the distinction between a falsifying hypothesis and the
main theory may also correspond to the distinction between direct vs. conceptual
replications that we discuss in a later section. On this view, direct replications
(attempt to) reproduce what the falsifying hypothesis states is necessary to generate
the original predicted effect, whereas conceptual replications are attempts to test
the main theory.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 621
Earp and Trafimow Replication, falsification, and psychology
The (Latest) Crisis in Social Psychology
and Calls for Replication
“Is there currently a crisis of confidence in psychological
science reflecting an unprecedented level of doubt among
practitioners about the reliability of research findings in the field?
It would certainly appear that there is.” So write Pashler and
Wagenmakers (2012, p. 529) in a recent issue of Perspectives on
Psychological Science. The “crisis” is not unique to psychology;
it is rippling through biomedicine and other fields as well
(Ioannidis, 2005; Loscalzo, 2012; Earp and Darby, 2015)—but
psychology will be the focus of this paper, if for no other reason
than that the present authors have been closer to the facts on the
ground.
Some of the causes of the crisis are fairly well known. In
2011, an eminent Dutch researcher confessed to making up data
and experiments, producing a résumé-full of “findings” that he
had simply invented out of whole cloth (Carey, 2011). He was
outed by his own students, however, and not by peer review nor
by any attempt to replicate his work. In other words, he might
just as well have not been found out, had he only been a little
more careful (Stroebe et al., 2012). An unsettling prospect was
thus aroused: Could other fraudulent “findings” be circulating—
undetected, and perhaps even undetectable—throughout the
published record? After an exhaustive analysis of the Dutch fraud
case, Stroebe et al. (2012) concluded that the notion of self-
correction in science was actually a “myth” (p. 670); and others
have offered similar pronouncements (Ioannidis, 2012a).
But fraud, it is hoped, is rare. Nevertheless, as Ioannidis
(2005, 2012a) and others have argued, the line between explicitly
fraudulent behavior and merely “questionable” research practices
is perilously thin, and the latter are probably common. John et al.
(2012) conducted a massive, anonymous survey of practicing
psychologists and showed that this conjecture is likely correct.
Psychologists admitted to such questionable research practices
as failing to report all of the dependent measures for which
they had collected data (78%)4, collecting additional data after
checking to see whether preliminary results were statistically
significant (72%), selectively reporting studies that “worked”
(67%), claiming to have predicted an unexpected finding (54%),
and failing to report all of the conditions that they ran (42%).
Each of these practices alone, and even more so when combined,
reduces the interpretability of the final reported statistics, casting
doubt upon any claimed “effects” (e.g., Simmons et al., 2011).
The motivation behind these practices, though not necessarily
conscious or deliberate, is also not obscure. Professional journals
have long had a tendency to publish only or primarily novel,
“statistically significant” effects, to the exclusion of replications—
and especially “failed” replications—or other null results. This
problem, known as “publication bias,” leads to a file-drawer effect
whereby “negative” experimental outcomes are simply “filed
away” in a researcher’s bottom drawer, rather than written up
and submitted for publication (e.g., Rosenthal, 1979).Meanwhile,
4The percentages reported here are the geometric mean of self-admission rates,
prevalence estimates by the psychologists surveyed, and prevalence estimates
derived by John et al. from the other two figures.
the “questionable research practices” carry on in full force, since
they increase the researcher’s chances of obtaining a “statistically
significant” finding—whether it turns out to be reliable or not.
To add insult to injury, in 2012, an acrimonious public
skirmish broke out in the form of dueling blog posts between
the distinguished author of a classic behavioral priming study5
and a team of researchers who had questioned his findings
(Yong, 2012). The disputed results had already been cited more
than 2000 times—an extremely large number for the field—and
even been enshrined in introductory textbooks. What if they
did turn out to be a fluke? Should other “priming studies” be
double-checked as well? Coverage of the debate ensued in the
mainstream media (e.g., Bartlett, 2013).
Another triggering event resulted in “widespread public
mockery” (Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012, p. 528). In contrast
to the fraud case described above, which involved intentional,
unblushing deception, the psychologist Daryl Bem relied on well-
established and widely-followed research and reporting practices
to generate an apparently fantastic result, namely evidence that
participants’ current responses could be influenced by future
events (Bem, 2011). Since such paranormal precognition is
inconsistent with widely-held theories about “the fundamental
nature of time and causality” (Lebel and Peters, p. 371), few
took the findings seriously. Instead, they began to wonder about
the “well-established and widely-followed research and reporting
practices” that had sanctioned the findings in the first place
(and allowed for their publication in a leading journal). As
Simmons et al. (2011) concluded—reflecting broadly on the state
of the discipline—“it is unacceptably easy to publish ‘statistically
significant’ evidence consistent with any hypothesis” (p. 1359)6.
The main culprit for this phenomenon is what Simmons et al.
(2011) identified as researcher degrees of freedom:
In the course of collecting and analyzing data, researchers have
many decisions to make: Should more data be collected? Should
some observations be excluded? Which conditions should be
combined and which ones compared? Which control variables
should be considered? Should specific measures be combined or
transformed or both?... It is rare, and sometimes impractical,
for researchers to make all these decisions beforehand. Rather,
it is common (and accepted practice) for researchers to explore
various analytic alternatives, to search for a combination that yields
“statistical significance” and to then report only what “worked.” (p.
1359)
One unfortunate consequence of such a strategy—involving, as it
does, some of the very same questionable research practices later
identified by John et al. (2012) in their survey of psychologists—
is that it inflates the possibility of producing a false positive (or
5Priming has been defined a number of different ways. Typically, it refers to the
ability of subtle cues in the environment to affect an individual’s thoughts and
behavior, often outside of her awareness or control (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand,
1999).
6Even more damning, Trafimow (2003; Trafimow and Rice, 2009; Trafimow and
Marks, 2015) has argued that the standard significance tests used in psychology are
invalid even when they are done “correctly.” Thus, even if psychologists were to
follow the prescriptions of Simmons et al.—and reduce their researcher degrees of
freedom (see the discussion following this footnote)—this would still fail to address
the core problem that such tests should not be used in the first place.
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a Type 1 error). Since such practices are “common” and even
“accepted,” the literature may be replete with erroneous results.
Thus, as Ioannidis (2005) declared after performing a similar
analysis in his own field of biomedicine, “most published research
findings” may be “false” (p. 0696, emphasis added). This has led
to the “unprecedented level of doubt” referred to by Pashler and
Wagenmakers (2012) in the opening quote to this section.
This not the first crisis for psychology. Giner-Sorolla (2012)
points out that “crises” of one sort or another “have been
declared regularly at least since the time of Wilhelm Wundt”—
with turmoil as recent as the 1970s inspiring particular déjà vu (p.
563). Then, as now, a string of embarrassing events—including
the publication in mainstream journals of literally unbelievable
findings7—led to “soul searching” amongst leading practitioners.
Standard experimental methods, statistical strategies, reporting
requirements, and norms of peer review were all put under the
microscope; numerous sources of bias were carefully rooted out
(e.g., Greenwald, 1975). While various calls for reform were
put forward—some more energetically than others—a single
corrective strategy seemed to emerge from all the din: the
need for psychologists to replicate their work. Since “all flawed
research practices yield findings that cannot be reproduced,”
critics reasoned, replication could be used to separate the wheat
from the chaff (Koole and Lakens, 2012, p. 608, emphasis added;
see also Elms, 1975).
The same calls reverberate today. “For psychology to truly
adhere to the principles of science,” write Ferguson and
Heene (2012), “the need for replication of research results [is]
important... to consider” (p. 556). LeBel and Peters (2011) put
it like this: “Across all scientific disciplines, close replication
is the gold standard for corroborating the discovery of an
empirical phenomenon” and “the importance of this point for
psychology has been notedmany times” (p. 375). Indeed, “leading
researchers [in psychology]” agree, according to Francis (2012),
that “experimental replication is the final arbiter in determining
whether effects are true or false” (p. 585).
We have already seen that such calls must be heeded with
caution: replication is not straightforward, and the outcome of
replication studies may be difficult to interpret. Indeed they
can never be conclusive on their own. But we suggested that
replications could be more or less informative; and in the
following sections we discuss some strategies for making them
“more” rather than “less.” We begin with a discussion of “direct”
vs. “conceptual” replication.
Increasing Replication Informativeness:
“Direct” vs. “Conceptual” Replication
In a systematic review of the literature, encompassing multiple
academic disciplines, Gómez et al. (2010) identified 18 different
types of replication. Three of these were from Lykken (1968),
who drew a distinction between “literal,” “operational,” and
7For example, a “study found that eating disorder patients were significantly more
likely than others to see frogs in a Rorschach test, which the author interpreted as
showing unconscious fear of oral impregnation and anal birth...” (Giner-Sorolla,
2012, p. 562).
“constructive”—which Schmidt (2009) then winnowed down
(and re-labeled) to arrive at “direct” and “conceptual” in an
influential paper. As Makel et al. (2012) have pointed out, it is
Schmidt’s particular framework that seems to have crystallized
in the field of psychology, shaping most of the subsequent
discussion on this issue. We have no particular reason to rock
the boat; indeed these categories will suit our argument just fine.
The first step in making a replication informative is to decide
what specifically it is for. “Direct” replications and “conceptual”
replications are “for” different things; and assigning them their
proper role and function will be necessary for resolving the crisis.
First, some definitions:
A “direct” replication may be defined as an experiment that
is intended to be as similar to the original as possible (Schmidt,
2009; Makel et al., 2012). This means that along every conceivable
dimension—from the equipment and materials used, to the
procedure, to the time of day, to the gender of the experimenter,
etc.—the replicating scientist should strive to avoid making any
kind of change or alteration. The purpose here is to “check”
the original results. Some changes will be inevitable, of course;
but the point is that only the inevitable changes (such as the
passage of time between experiments) are ideally tolerated in this
form of replication. In a “conceptual” replication, by contrast, at
least certain elements of the original experiment are intentionally
altered, (ideally) systematically so, toward the end of achieving
a very different sort of purpose—namely to see whether a given
phenomenon, assuming that it is reliable, might obtain across a
range of variable conditions. But as Doyen et al. (2014) note in a
recent paper:
The problem with conceptual replication in the absence of direct
replication is that there is no such thing as a “conceptual failure
to replicate.” A failure to find the same “effect” using a different
operationalization can be attributed to the differences in method
rather than to the fragility of the original effect. Only the successful
conceptual replications will be published, and the unsuccessful ones
can be dismissed without challenging the underlying foundations
of the claim. Consequently, conceptual replication without direct
replication is unlikely to change beliefs about the underlying effect
(p. 28).
In simplest terms, therefore, a “direct” replication seeks to
validate a particular fact or finding; whereas a “conceptual”
replication seeks to validate the underlying theory or
phenomenon—i.e., the theory that has been proposed to
“predict” the effect that was obtained by the initial experiment—
as well to establish the boundary conditions within which the
theory holds true (Nosek et al., 2012). The latter is impossible
without the former. In other words, if we cannot be sure that our
finding is reliable to begin with (because it turns out to have been
a coincidence, or else a false alarm due to questionable research
practices, publication bias, or fraud), then we are in no position
to begin testing the theory by which it is supposedly explained
(Cartwright, 1991; see also Earp et al., 2014).
Of course both types of replication are important, and there
is no absolute line between them. Rather, as Asendorpf et al.
(2013) point out, “direct replicability [is] one extreme pole
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of a continuous dimension extending to broad generalizability
[via ‘conceptual’ replication] at the other pole, ranging across
multiple, theoretically relevant facets of study design” (p. 139).
Collins made a similar point in 1985 (e.g., p. 37). But so long
as we remain largely ignorant about exactly which “facets of
study design” are “theoretically relevant” to begin with—as is the
case with much of current social psychology (Meehl, 1990b), and
nearly all of the most heavily-contested experimental findings—
we need to orient our attention more toward the “direct” end of
the spectrum8.
How else can replication be made more informative? Brandt
et al. (2014)’s “Replication Recipe” offers several important
factors, one of which must be highlighted to begin with. This is
their contention that a “convincing” replication should be carried
out outside the lab of origin. Clearly this requirement shifts away
from the “direct” extreme of the replication gradient that we
have emphasized so far, but such a change from the original
experiment, in this case, is justified. As Ioannidis (2012b) points
out, replications by the original researchers—while certainly
important and to be encouraged as a preliminary step—are not
sufficient to establish “convincing” experimental reliability. This
is because allegiance and confirmation biases, which may apply
especially to the original team, would be less of an issue for
independent replicators.
Partially against this view, Schnall (2014, np) argues that
“authors of the original work should be allowed to participate
in the process of having their work replicated.” On the one
hand, this might have the desirable effect of ensuring that the
replication attempt faithfully reproduces the original procedure.
It seems reasonable to think that the original author would
know more than anyone else about how the original research
was conducted—so her viewpoint is likely to be helpful. On the
other hand, however, too much input by the original author
could compromise the independence of the replication: shemight
have a strong motivation to make the replication a success,
which could subtly influence the results (see Earp and Darby,
2015).Whichever position one takes on the appropriate degree of
input and/or oversight from the original author, however, Schnall
(2014, np) is certainly right to note that “the quality standards for
replications need to be at least as high as for the original findings.
Competent evaluation by experts is absolutely essential, and is
especially important if replication authors have no prior expertise
with a given research topic.”
Other ingredients in increasing the informativeness of
replication attempts include: (1) carefully defining the effects and
methods that the researchers intend to replicate; (2) following
as exactly as possible the methods of the original study (as
described above); (3) having high statistical power (i.e., an
adequate sample size to detect an effect if one is really present);
(4) making complete details about the replication available, so
that interested experts can fully evaluate the replication attempt
8Asendorpf et al. (2013) explain why this is so: “[direct] replicability is a necessary
condition for further generalization and thus indispensible for building solid
starting points for theoretical development. Without such starting points, research
may become lost in endless fluctuation between alternative generalization studies
that add numerous boundary conditions but fail to advance theory about why these
boundary conditions exist” (p. 140, emphasis added).
(or attempt another replication themselves); and (5) evaluating
the replication results, comparing them critically to the results of
the study (Brandt et al., 2014, p. 218, paraphrased). This list is
not exhaustive, but it gives a concrete sense of how “stabilizing”
procedures (see Radder, 1992) can be employed to give greater
credence to the quality and informativeness of replication
efforts.
Replication, Falsification, and Auxiliary
Assumptions
Brandt et al.’s (2014) “replication recipe” provides a vital tool
for researchers seeking to conduct high quality replications. In
this section, we offer an additional “ingredient” to the discussion,
by highlighting the role of auxiliary assumptions in increasing
replication informativeness, specifically as these pertain to the
relationship between replication and falsification. Consider the
logical fallacy of affirming the consequent that provided an
important basis for Popper’s falsification argument.
If the theory is true,
an observation should occur (T → O) (Premise 1)
The observation occurs (O) (Premise 2)
Therefore, the theory is true (T) (Conclusion)
Obviously, the conclusion does not follow. Any number of things
might have led to the observation that have nothing to dowith the
theory being proposed (see Earp, 2015 for a similar argument).
On the other hand, denying the consequent (modus tollens) does
invalidate the theory, strictly according to the logic given:
If the theory is true,
an observation should occur (T → O) (Premise 1)
The observation does not occur (∼O) (Premise 2)
Therefore, the theory is not true (∼T) (Conclusion)
Given this logical asymmetry, then, between affirming and
denying the consequent of a theoretical prediction (see Earp
and Everett, 2013), Popper opted for the latter. By doing so,
he famously defended a strategy of disconfirming rather than
confirming theories. Yet if the goal is to disconfirm theories, then
the theories must be capable of being disconfirmed in the first
place; hence, a basic requirement of scientific theories (in order
to count as properly scientific) is that they have this feature: they
must be falsifiable.
As we hinted at above, however, this basic framework is
an oversimplification. As Popper himself noted, and as was
made particularly clear by Lakatos (1978; also see Duhem, 1954;
Quine, 1980), scientists do not derive predictions only from a
given theory, but rather from a combination of the theory and
auxiliary assumptions. The auxiliary assumptions are not part of
the theory proper, but they serve several important functions.
One of these functions is to show the link between the sorts of
outcomes that a scientist can actually observe (i.e., by running
an experiment), and the non-observable, “abstract” content of
the theory itself. To pick one classic example from psychology,
according to the theory of reasoned action (e.g., Fishbein, 1980),
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attitudes determine subjective norms. One implication of this
theoretical assumption is that researchers should be able to obtain
strong correlations between attitudes and behavioral intentions.
But this assumes, among other things, that a check mark on
an attitude scale really indicates a person’s attitude, and that
a check mark on an intention scale really indicates a person’s
intention. The theory of reasoned action has nothing to say about
whether check marks on scales indicate attitudes or intentions;
these are assumptions that are peripheral to the basic theory.
They are auxiliary assumptions that researchers use to connect
non-observational terms such as “attitude” and “intention” to
observable phenomena such as check marks. Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975) recognized this and took great pains to spell out, as well
as possible, the auxiliary assumptions that best aid in measuring
theoretically relevant variables (see also Ajzen and Fishbein,
1980).
The existence of auxiliary assumptions complicates the project
of falsification. This is because the major premise of the modus
tollens argument—denying the consequent of the theoretical
prediction—must be stated somewhat differently. It must be
stated like this: “If the theory is true and a set of auxiliary
assumptions is true, an observation should occur.” Keeping the
second premise the same implies that either the theory is not
true or that at least one auxiliary assumption is not true, as the
following syllogism (in symbols only) illustrates.
T & (A1 & A2 . . .An) → O (Premise 1)
∼ O (Premise 2)
∴∼ T or ∼ (A1 & A2 . . .An)=
∼ T or ∼ A1 or ∼ A2 . . . ∼ An (Conclusion)
Consider an example. It often is said that Newton’s gravitational
theory predicted where planets would be at particular times.
But this is not precisely accurate. It would be more accurate
to say that such predictions were derived from a combination
of Newton’s theory and auxiliary assumptions not contained in
that theory (e.g., about the present locations of the planets).
To return to our example about attitudes and intentions from
psychology, consider the mini-crisis in social psychology from
the 1960s, when it became clear to researchers that attitudes—
the kingly construct—failed to predict behaviors. Much of the
impetus for the theory of reasoned action (e.g., Fishbein, 1980)
was Fishbein’s realization that there was a problem with attitude
measurement at the time: when this problem was fixed, strong
attitude-behavior (or at least attitude-intention) correlations
became the rule rather than the exception. This episode provides
a compelling illustration of a case in which attention to the
auxiliary assumptions that bore on actual measurement played
a larger role in resolving a crisis in psychology than debates over
the theory itself.
What is the lesson here? Due to the fact that failures to obtain a
predicted observation can be blamed either on the theory itself or
on at least one auxiliary assumption, absolute theory falsification
is about as problematic as is absolute theory verification. In the
Newton example, when some of Newton’s planetary predictions
were shown to be wrong, he blamed the failures on incorrect
auxiliary assumptions rather than on his theory, arguing that
there were additional but unknown astronomical bodies that
skewed his findings—which turned out to be a correct defense
of the theory. Likewise, in the attitude literature, the theoretical
connection between attitudes and behaviors turned out to be
correct (as far as we know) with the problem having been
caused by incorrect auxiliary assumptions pertaining to attitude
measurement.
There is an additional consequence to the necessity of giving
explicit consideration to one’s auxiliary assumptions. Suppose, as
often happens in psychology, that a researcher deems a theory
to be unfalsifiable because he or she does not see any testable
predictions. Is the theory really unfalsifiable or is the problem that
the researcher has not been sufficiently thorough in identifying
the necessary auxiliary assumptions that would lead to falsifiable
predictions? Given that absolute falsification is impossible,
and that researchers are therefore limited to some kind of
“reasonable” falsification, Trafimow (2009) has argued that many
allegedly unfalsifiable theories are reasonably falsifiable after all:
it is just a matter of researchers having to be more thoughtful
about considering auxiliary assumptions. Trafimow documented
examples of theories that had been described as unfalsifiable that
one could in fact falsify by proposing better auxiliary assumptions
than had been imagined by previous researchers.
The notion that auxiliary assumptions can vary in quality is
relevant for replication. Consider, for example, the case alluded
to earlier regarding a purported failure to replicate Bargh et al.’s
(1996) famous priming results. In the replication attempt of
this well-known “walking time” study (Doyen et al., 2012), laser
beams were used to measure the speed with which participants
left the laboratory, rather than students with stopwatches.
Undoubtedly, this adjustment was made on the basis of a
reasonable auxiliary assumption that methods of measuring
time that are less susceptible to human idiosyncrasies would
be superior to methods that are more susceptible to them.
Does the fact that the failed replication was not exactly like the
original experiment disqualify it as invalid? At least with regard
to this particular feature of this particular replication attempt,
the answer is clearly “no.” If a researcher uses a better auxiliary
assumption than in the original experiment, this should add to
its validity rather than subtract from it9.
But suppose, for a particular experiment, that we are not in
a good position to judge the superiority of alternative auxiliary
assumptions. We might invoke what Meehl (1990b) termed the
ceteris paribus (all else equal) assumption. This idea, applied to
the issue of direct replications, suggests that for researchers to be
confident that a replication attempt is a valid one, the auxiliary
assumptions in the replication have to be sufficiently similar to
those in the original experiment that any differences in findings
cannot reasonably be attributed to differences in the assumptions.
Put another way, all of the unconsidered auxiliary assumptions
should be indistinguishable in the relevant way: that is, all have to
be sufficiently equal or sufficiently right or sufficiently irrelevant
so as not to matter to the final result.
9There may be other reasons why the “failed” replication by Doyen et al. should
not be considered conclusive, of course; for further discussion see, e.g., Lieberman
(2012).
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What makes it allowable for a researcher to make the ceteris
paribus assumption? In a strict philosophical sense, of course,
it is not allowable. To see this, suppose that Researcher A has
published an experiment, Researcher B has replicated it, but the
replication failed. If Researcher A claims that Researcher B made
a mistake in performing the replication, or just got unlucky, there
is no way to disprove Researcher A’s argument absolutely. But
suppose that Researchers C, D, E, and F also attempt replications,
and also fail. It becomes increasingly difficult to support the
contention that Researchers B–F all “did it wrong” or were
unlucky, and that we should continue to accept Researcher A’s
version of the experiment. Even if amillion researchers attempted
replications, and all of them failed, it is theoretically possible
that Researcher A’s version is the unflawed one and all the
others are flawed. But most researchers would conclude (and
in our view, would be right to conclude) that it is more likely
that it is Researcher A who got it wrong and not the million
researchers who failed to replicate the observation. Thus, we
are not arguing that replications, whether successful or not, are
definitive. Rather, our argument is that replications (of sufficient
quality) are informative.
Introducing a Bayesian Framework
To see why this is the case, we shall employ a Bayesian framework
similar to Trafimow (2010). Suppose that an aficionado of
Researcher A believes that the prior probability of anything
Researcher A said or did is very high. Researcher B attempts
a replication of an experiment by Researcher A and fails. The
aficionadomight continue confidently to believe in Researcher A’s
version, but the aficionado’s confidence likely would be decreased
slightly. Well then, as there are more replication failures, the
aficionado’s confidence would continue to decrease accordingly,
and at some point the decrease in confidence would push the
aficionado’s confidence below the 50% mark, in which case the
aficionado would put more credence in the replication failures
than on the success obtained by Researcher A.
In the foregoing scenario, we would want to know the
probability that the original result is actually true given




. As Equation (1)
shows, this depends on the aficionado’s prior level of confidence
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Alternatively, we could frame what we want to know in terms
of a confidence ratio that the original result is true or not true
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Suppose that the aficionado is a very strong one, so that the
prior confidence ratio is 50. In addition, the probability ratio
pertaining to failing to replicate is 0.5. It is worthwhile to clarify
two points about this probability ratio. First, we assume that the
probability of failing to replicate is less if the original finding is
true than if it is not true, so that the ratio ought to be substantially
less than 1. Second, how much less than 1 this ratio will be
depends largely on the quality of the replication; as the replication
becomes closer to meeting the ideal ceteris paribus condition, the
ratio will deviate increasingly from 1. Put more generally, as the
quality of the auxiliary assumptions going into the replication
attempt increases, the ratio will decrease. Given these two ratios
of 50 and 0.5, the posterior confidence ratio is 25. Although this is
a substantial decrease in confidence from 50, the aficionado still
believes that the finding is extremely likely to be true. But suppose
there is another replication failure and the probability ratio is
0.8. In that case, the new confidence ratio is (25) (0.8) = 20.
The pattern should be clear here: As there are more replication
failures, a rational person, even if that person is an aficionado
of the original researcher, will experience continually decreasing
confidence as the replication failures mount.
If we imagine that there areN attempts to replicate the original
finding that fail, the process described in the foregoing paragraph
can be summarized in a single equation that gives the ratio of
posterior confidences in the original finding, given that there
have been N failures to replicate. This is a function of the prior
confidence ratio and the probability ratios in the first replication





















For example, staying with our aficionado with a prior confidence
ratio of 50, imagine a set of 10 replication failures, with the
following probability ratios: 0.5, 0.8, 0.7, 0.65, 0.75, 0.56, 0.69,
0.54, 0.73, and 0.52. The final confidence ratio, according to
Equation (3), would be:
(50)(0.5)(0.8)(0.7)(0.65)(0.75)(0.56)(0.69)(0.54)(0.73)(0.52)
= 0.54.
Note the following. First, even with an extreme prior confidence
ratio (we had set it at 50 for the aficionado), it is possible to
overcome it with a reasonable number of replication failures
providing that the person tallying the replication failures is
a rational Bayesian (and there is reason to think that those
attempting the replications are sufficiently competent in the
subject area and methods to be qualified to undertake them).
Second, it is possible to go from a state of extreme confidence to
one of substantial lack of confidence. To see this in the example,
take the reciprocal of the final confidence ratio (0.54), which
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equals 1.84. In other words, the Bayesian aficionado now believes
that the finding is 1.84 times as likely to be not true as true. If we
imagine yet more failed attempts to replicate, it is easy to foresee
that the future belief that the original finding is not true could
eventually become as powerful, or more powerful, than the prior
belief that the original finding is true.
In summary, auxiliary assumptions play a role, not only for
original theory-testing experiments but also in replications—
even in replications concerned only with the original finding and
not with the underlying theory. A particularly important
auxiliary assumption is the ever-present ceteris paribus
assumption, and the extent to which it applies influences
the “convincingness” of the replication attempt. Thus, a change
in confidence in the original finding is influenced both by the
quality and quantity of the replication attempts, as Equation (3)
illustrates.
In presenting Equations (1–3), we reduced the theoretical
content as much as possible, and more than is realistic in
actual research10, in considering so-called “direct” replications.
As the replications serve other purposes, such as “conceptual”
replications, the amount of theoretical content is likely to
increase. To link that theoretical content to the replication
attempt, more auxiliary assumptions will become necessary. For
example, in a conceptual replication of an experiment finding
that attitudes influence behavior, the researcher might use a
different attitude manipulation or a different behavior measure.
How do we know that the different manipulation and measure
are sufficiently theoretically unimportant that the conceptual
replication really is a replication (i.e., a test of the underlying
theory)? We need new auxiliary assumptions linking the new
manipulation and measure to the corresponding constructs in
the theory, just as an original set of auxiliary assumptions
was necessary in the original experiment to link the original
manipulation andmeasure to the corresponding constructs in the
theory. Auxiliary assumptions always matter—and they should
be made explicit so far as possible. In this way, it will be easier to
identify where in the chain of assumptions a “breakdown” must
have occurred, in attempting to explain an apparent failure to
replicate.
10Indeed, we have presented our analysis in this section in abstract terms so that
the underlying reasoning could be seen most clearly. However, this necessarily
raises the question of how to go about implementing these ideas in practice. As
a reviewer points out, to calculate probabilities, the theory being tested would
need to be represented as a probability model; then in effect one would have
Bayes factors to deal with. We note that both Dienes (2014) and Verhagen
and Wagenmakers (2014) have presented methods for assessing the strength of
evidence of a replication attempt (i.e., in confirming the original result) along these
lines, and we refer the reader to their papers for further consideration.
Conclusion
Replication is not a silver bullet. Even carefully-designed
replications, carried out in good faith by expert investigators, will
never be conclusive on their own. But as Tsang and Kwan (1999)
point out:
If replication is interpreted in a strict sense, [conclusive] replications
or experiments are also impossible in the natural sciences.. . .
So, even in the “hardest” science (i.e., physics) complete closure is
not possible. The best we can do is control for conditions that are
plausibly regarded to be relevant. (p. 763)
Nevertheless, “failed” replications, especially, might be dismissed
by an original investigator as being flawed or “incompetently”
performed—but this sort of accusation is just too easy. The
original investigator should be able to describe exactly what
parameters she sees as being theoretically relevant, and under
what conditions her “effect” should obtain. If a series of
replications is carried out, independently by different labs,
and deliberately tailored to the parameters and conditions so
described—yet they reliably fail to produce the original result—
then this should be considered informative. At the very least, it
will suggest that the effect is sensitive to theoretically-unspecified
factors, whose specification is sorely needed. At most, it should
throw the existence of the effect into doubt, possibly justifying
a shift in research priorities. Thus, while “falsification” can in
principle be avoided ad infinitum, with enough creative effort
by one who wished to defend a favored theory, scientists should
not seek to “rescue” a given finding at any empirical cost11.
Informative replications can reasonably factor into scientists’
assessment about just what that cost might be; and they should
pursue such replications as if the credibility of their field
depended on it. In the case of experimental social psychology, it
does.
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